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Abstract
This Article is an attempt to describe the current state of the evolving law on liquidated dam-
ages and to focus attention on several of the emerging areas that are likely to require administrative,
congressional, or judicial action.
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INTRODUCTION
The substantive and procedural law governing liquidated
damage cases has changed dramatically in recent years without
the benefit of any comprehensive review or plan. The U.S.
Congress did not adopt an omnibus liquidated damage simpli-
fication act, nor has the U.S. Customs Service (the "Customs
Service" or "Customs") adopted a comprehensive regulatory
scheme designed to harmonize the voluminous flow of notices,
demands, bills, protests, petitions, and court cases involved in
the joint and several liabilities of bond principals and their
sureties. Instead, the last decade has been punctuated by fun-
damental changes developed in an intermittent and piece-meal
fashion. Occasional Customs Service rulings and regulatory
changes, supplemented or inspired by decisions issued by the
courts in the handful of cases that received judicial review,
have left us with a patchwork of procedural and substantive
law. Whether the pieces neatly fit, or whether they have left
gaps or holes to be patched over, should be a cause for con-
cern among all three parties to the bond: Customs, bond prin-
cipals, and sureties.
This Article is limited in scope. It is not a comprehensive
review of liquidated damage developments. It is an attempt to
describe the current state of the evolving law on liquidated
damages and to focus attention on several of the emerging ar-
t This Article is based on a paper submitted to the Sixth Annual Judicial
Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade held on November 3, 1989.
The paper formed the basis for the Author's participation in a panel discussion at
that conference. The views expressed in this Article are personal to the Author.
* Founder and Senior Partner, Sandier, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A; Trial Attor-
ney, Customs Section, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, 1969-1975. The
Author acknowledges the assistance of Ellen Rubin, Esq., in the preparation of this
Article.
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eas that are likely to require administrative, congressional, or
judicial action.
I. THE CHANGING LIQUIDATED DAMAGE ENVIRONMENT
Customs has relied upon bonds to secure the obligations
of private citizens since the turn of the nineteenth century. In
1799, the U.S. Congress adopted legislation that remains a
part of title nineteen of the U.S. Code: the right to assess six
percent interest on any duties recovered in a law suit brought
by Customs upon a bond.' Despite the ancient reliance by
Customs on surety bonds, the last decade has witnessed an
awesome array of developments defining for the first time the
basic procedures for dealing with surety bonds and their re-
lated liquidated damages. The new developments are so basic
as to suggest that virtually no procedures were established dur-
ing the preceding 180 years.
A. The Surety's Right to Protest
The right of the surety to file a protest against liquidation
had been recognized by the courts, but not by any Customs
Service regulation or directive.2 In 1979, Congress for the
first time established a realistic opportunity for sureties to ex-
ercise their protest right. In recognition of the fact that sure-
ties are unlikely to receive notice of a liquidation and the re-
quired information to protest within ninety days of liquidation,
Congress extended the time period for surety protests to
ninety days following the demand on surety.3
B. The Surety's Right to Information
The surety's right to obtain access to entry documents was
denied by Customs as late as 1981, two years after the adop-
tion of the statute extending the due date for surety protests.
This was more than a decade after St. Paul Fire and Marine Insur-
ance Company v. United States.4 A Customs Service telex stated
1. 19 U.S.C. § 580 (1988).
2. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 370 F.2d 870, 873-74 (5th
Cir. 1967).
3. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(2) (1988) [hereinafter
1979 Trade Act].
4. 370 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1967).
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that "[u]ntil such time as Customs Headquarters formulates a
definite national policy respecting the release to and/or copy-
ing of such information by a surety filing a protest, the [re-
gional office] will not allow such inspection or copying."5
Later in 1981, however, Customs Service headquarters ad-
vised, by telex, all of its field offices to permit sureties access to
such information, stating that "sureties have attained the status
of a party-in-interest, and as such ...are entitled to request
and receive copies of the bond and the entry, as well as any
documents submitted by and for the importer in support of the
entry." 6
In 1988, the Customs Service published its first, and as yet
only, official standard on surety information access. That no-
tice reaffirmed the right of sureties to obtain basic information
at the time of a bond's issue, but limited the sureties' access to
much of the information flowing from the importer prior to a
breach of the bond.7
C. The Right to Petition and Protest Liquidated Damage Claims
The right of both importers and other bond principals to
file petitions against liquidated damage claims has been well
established in Customs regulations for many years. The right
of the surety to petition, however, was not clearly established
until 1981.8
The right of both importers and sureties to protest liqui-
dated damage assessments, meanwhile, is still a matter of de-
bate and controversy. In 1982, the U.S. government argued
that liquidated damage assessments are not protestable. 9 In
1988, the Customs Service argued that legal issues may only be
raised against liquidated damage assessments by the filing of a
ninety-day protest.'0 This unresolved issue is specifically ad-
5. Letter of Regional Office of Classification and Value of U.S. Customs Service
at Miami, Florida ofJan. 28, 1981 (File PRO-I-O:C MMM) (copy on file at the Fordham
International Law Journal office).
6. Telex from Headquarters of U.S. Customs Service of Feb. 19, 1981 (copy on
file at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
7. Customs Service Notice, 53 Fed. Reg. 6,216 (Mar. 1, 1988).
8. C.S.D. 81-3, 15 Cust. B. & Dec. 752 (1981).
9. United States v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 4 CIT 83 (1982).
10. United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 250, 252 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987), rev'd, 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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dressed in a subsequent section of this Article.It
How have the administrative procedures developed so as
to avoid the potential confusion and unnecessary burden in
handling the competing information requests, protests, peti-
tions, and demands for payment to both the surety and its
principal? The regulations and language of the bonds have
never established a strict priority for seeking payment from the
principal and its surety. The liquidated damage notice regula-
tion, however, states only that a courtesy copy of the initial no-
tice should be provided to the surety.' 2 Traditionally, Cus-
toms has dealt exclusively with the bond principal for a period
of time and only thereafter made demand on the surety.' 3
Generally, Customs has merely stated that the obligations of
the principal and the surety are "joint and several" without
further elaboration. 1 4
With regard to protests by "different authorized persons,"
Congress long ago provided that Customs should treat the
separate filings as "part of a single protest."' 5 It appears, how-
ever, that Customs has never treated such protests together.
Regarding liquidated damages, there is no statute or Customs
Service regulation establishing a unified procedure for the
handling of multiple petitions.
Thus, almost 200 years after Congress first established a
procedure utilizing bonds for import transactions, we are for
the first time dealing with some of the most fundamental rights
and procedures concerning those bonds: the rights of import-
ers and sureties to protest, the rights of sureties both to peti-
tion and gain access to the documentary evidence concerning
breaches of their bond, the obligations of Customs under the
bond, and the orderly handling of the relative obligations of
importers and sureties. The evolution of these issues is far
from complete. The following sections of this Article will dis-
cuss some of the issues likely to emerge in the future, and will
suggest possible resolutions.
11. See infra notes 16-44 and accompanying text.
12. 19 C.F.R. § 172.1(a) (1990).
13. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 254 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 381; T.D. 87-151, 52 Fed. Reg. 12,149 (Apr. 15, 1987).
14. See, e.g., T.D. 88-72, 22 Cust. B. & Dec., No. 48 (Nov. 30, 1988).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1) (1988).
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II. ACCESS TOJUDICIAL REVIEW OF LIQUIDATED
DAMAGE CLAIMS: COPING WITH THE
LITIGATION/MITIGATION OPTION
Liquidated damage notices may be contested immediately
by filing a petition within thirty days.' 6 At the conclusion of
the administrative process, however, a mitigation decision is-
sued by Customs is not protestable or subject to judicial re-
view.1 7 It is now settled that the courts will review the legality
of the liquidated damage claim when the principal or surety
raises a legal defense in response to a collection action. 8 The
question remains unresolved as to whether the importer and
surety have an option to initiate litigation by protesting the liq-
uidated damage notice under section 1514 of title nineteen of
the U.S. Code and filing a summons against a denial.
It has been said that judicial review may be affirmatively
sought by protesting and filing a summons after payment of
the full liquidated damages. Presumably, this opinion is based
upon a conclusion that recent cases which have held that a pro-
test is not required by importers and sureties have left unde-
cided whether they have an option to protest. It is the opinion
of the Author, however, that the section 1514 protest and sub-
sequent summons filed in the U.S. Court of International
Trade (the "CIT") is not an alternative available under statute
to either the importer or its surety. The filing of a protest may
serve the legitimate purpose of inviting administrative review
of legal issues prior to filing a collection action, but it cannot
confer jurisdiction on the CIT in an action by the protestor
against a denied "protest."
A. The Authority For Protesting Liquidated Damage Claims
Courts have held that an importer or surety who fails to
protest a liquidated damage notice may nonetheless raise legal
defenses to the government's collection action.' 9 Because the
protest statute is actually a statute of limitations for the raising
16. 19 C.F.R. § 171.12(b) (1990).
17. See United States v. Borge Int'l, 9 CIT 484 (1985).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 250, 253 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987), rev'd, 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
19. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Toshoku Am., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1006 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987), rev'd, 879 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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of legal issues, the courts could not logically have issued these
decisions unless they had concluded that liquidated damage
decisions are not protestable decisions under section 1514.
Section 1514(a) states that the protestable decision "shall be
final and conclusive upon all persons . . . unless a protest is
filed in accordance with this section."' 20 If no protest is filed,
the legality of the assessment is final and unchallengeable by a
defendant in a collection action.
Consistent with this logic, courts have specifically stated
that "an assessment of liquidated damages is not [a] 'charge or
exaction' that must be challenged by protest under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1514 (1982). '21
This is not unmindful of the decision in United States v. Ba-
varian Motors, Inc. 22 dismissing the government's collection ac-
tion on the ground that it was premature; a surety protest was
pending administratively. 23 The CIT did not consider the mat-
ters before the appellate courts in United States v. Utex Interna-
tional, Inc. 24 and United States v. Toshoku America, Inc. .25 In any
event, the result in Bavarian Motors was correct because the
CIT need not accept jurisdiction prior to completion of the ad-
ministrative process.
Regardless of whether the "protest" in Bavarian Motors
was properly fileable under section 1514, the surety and the
importer have the right to advise the government of any de-
fense which might be raised in future litigation. The govern-
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1988). One decision of the CIT issued after this Article
was originally written rejected the U.S. government's claim that liquidated damage
notices must be protested under section 1514. Halperin Shipping Co. v. United
States, 742 F. Supp. 1163 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990). Prior to holding that a Department
of Treasury decision rejecting an offer-in-compromise and making a "demand for
payment" is not a protestable "charge or exaction," the trial judge noted that two
prior decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had "squarely
rejected" the government's claim that notices of liquidated damages are protestable.
Id. (citing Toshoku and Utex).
21. Toshoku, 879 F.2d at 818 (explaining holding in United States v. Utex Int'l
Inc., 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
22. 4 CIT 83 (1982).
23. Id.
24. 659 F. Supp. 250 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), rev'd, 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
25. 670 F. Supp. 1006 (Ct. Int'l Trade), rev'd, 879 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Compare Bavarian Motors, 4 CIT 83 with supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Utex and Toshoku decisions).
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ment has an interest (if not an obligation) in reviewing such
issues so as to avoid such litigation. The CIT, meanwhile, has
an interest in encouraging such submissions so that it can
avoid entertaining unnecessary litigation, or at least has the
benefit of complete administrative records where it must enter-
tain litigation.
There are many reasons why the courts are correct in their
conclusion that liquidated damages are not "protestable" deci-
sions. The liquidated damage notice advises the recipient that
it has thirty days to file a petition; it does not advise that there
are ninety days to file a protest. The absence of this notice (or
of any other notice required by statute, regulation, or long-
standing administrative practice) advising of the requirement
or option to file a protest is so fundamentally inconsistent with
the principles of due process that no court should imply the
existence of such an obligation or option. In similar circum-
stances, the CIT has dismissed a government characterization
of a fee as a protestable "charge or exaction," referring to this
instead as a "post-litigation rationalization.' '26
Sureties have historically been permitted to raise all legal
defenses to a collection action even when no protest has been
filed. Neither Congress nor the Customs Service has passed
legislation or regulations to modify this practice. As the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded in Utex:
"[i]t is not characteristic of either the law of surety or the law
of contracts that a defendant must routinely pay the amount
demanded prior to judicial determination of contractual liabil-
ity. Absent statutory directive or clear Congressional intent to
the contrary, we do not impose it. ' 2 1
It would be particularly inappropriate to imply such a
unique requirement for full payment of liquidated damages in
light of the large disparity between the full bond amount and
the amount that Customs will reasonably accept in full satisfac-
tion of the contract or bond violation under its mitigation
guidelines and compromise procedures. Liquidated damages
are normally assessed by Customs in large amounts set by Cus-
toms regulations, subject to mitigation by the agency under its
26. National Bonded Warehouse Ass'n v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 904, 906
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
27. United States v. Utex Int'l Inc., 857 F.2d 1408, 1414 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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administrative guidelines.2 8
Examination of the recently published mitigation (i.e.,
Bond Cancellation) guidelines demonstrates the dramatic dif-
ference in the bond amount and the amount Customs reason-
ably expects to collect upon filing of a petition.29 Both repeat
and aggravated violators of the country-of-origin marking laws
can expect mitigation to an amount between twenty-five and
fifty percent of the bond." Documentary late-filing cases,
under regulation and mitigation guidelines, are demanded in
full bond amounts and mitigated to nominal sums.3
To seek judicial review of a liquidated damage case, there-
fore, an importer or surety typically must reject an offer or op-
portunity for substantial mitigation. Payment of a large sum as
a precondition to litigation would have an unreasonable chil-
ling effect on judicial review and should not be imposed unless
expressly required by statute.
Furthermore, liquidated damages assessed for violation of
the bond's contractual obligations can be described in the
same manner as the annual warehouse fees which were held to
be nonprotestable:
As this court acknowledged in its previous opinion, both Pu-
get Sound Freight Lines and Atlantic Transport Co. v. United
States, 5 Ct. Cust. App. 373 (1914), though distinguishable
from the case at hand, indicated that fees, exactions or
charges which bear no relation to the importation of mer-
chandise and the rate of duty resulting from such classifiga-
tion, do not fall within the meaning of "charges or exactions
of whatever character" as used in 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(3). 32
Thus, it must be concluded that liquidated damages are
not protestable 3 However, that conclusion raises a new issue
28. See generally DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY (UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE),
CUSTOMS FINES, PENALTIES & FORFEITURES HANDBOOK (HB 4400-0 1). at pp. LDS-1 -
LDS-47 (Apr. 1986 revision).
29. T.D. No. 89-48, 23 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 18, § IV(E)(3), at 8 (May 3, 1989).
30. Id. Lesser violations are routinely reduced to amounts ranging from one
percent to five percent, but are never lessened below US$100. Id. § IV(D)(2), at 8.
31. Id. § I, at 2-4 (regarding 19 C.F.R. § 142.15 (1990)); id. § V at 10-11 (regard-
ing 19 C.F.R. § 113.42 (1990)).
32. National Bonded Warehouse Ass'n v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 904, 906
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
33. This conclusion raises the question whether there is any possibility that an
importer or surety may bring an affirmative action in court to control a liquidated
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of considerable concern: what is the effect of the many "pro-
tests" that have been filed against liquidated damage assess-
ments?
B. The Effects of Protesting Liquidated Damage Claims
Customs has invited the filing of protests against liqui-
dated damage assessments by installing a computerized proce-
dure that issues "notices of liquidated damages" advising the
recipient it must file its petition within thirty days. At the same
time, Customs headquarters has directed its field offices to ac-
cept petitions within ninety days because the principal and
surety are regarded as having the right to file a ninety-day pro-
test. The Customs computer has been programmed to post-
pone issuing bills until expiration of the ninety-day period
without the filing of a petition or protest. 34
As a practical matter, some parties have responded to de-
mands after the thirty-day petition period, but prior to the
ninety-first day, by filing "protests" so as to give notice to the
government of their objections to the assessment. Under Cus-
toms procedures, the pendency of such a protest prevents the
government from treating the assessment as "delinquent."
The filing of such a "protest" is appropriate because it is
the only existing regulatory procedure recognized by Customs
for contesting a liquidated damage notice more than thirty
dayi after its issuance. A petition filed at that late date is likely
to be rejected as untimely; Customs does not freely grant ex-
tensions of the petition period. 35  Customs will accept the
"protest" during the ninety-day period and will issue a deci-
sion in response to the protest.
What happens if Customs denies the protest? Having
damage case suit. If the protest procedure does not apply, then the only jurisdiction
in the CIT exists where Customs files a collection action. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1585
(1988) (denoting jurisdictional powers of CIT). It is doubtful that the CIT has juris-
diction under its residual authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1988). The Court of
Claims recently ruled it is without authority because the government is not a "party"
to the surety contract. Washington Int'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 663,
aff'd, 889 F.2d 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
34. While this procedure is not the subject of any published notice, it is the
current procedure as repeatedly described by officials at Customs Service Headquar-
ters in public meetings with the surety industry, and is consistent with the experience
of the Author and his clients.
35. See 19 C.F.R. § 172.12 (1990).
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elected to file a section 1514 "protest," has the "protestant"
subjected the decision to finality and waived any right to de-
fend against a collection action? It appears not. If the liqui-
dated damage claim is not final by operation of section 1514
when no protest is filed,36 it also cannot become final by virtue
of a protest denial. No language within the statute supports an
interpretation that would apply the statute in one instance but
not in the other.
Furthermore, the fact that the document filed with Cus-
toms is designated as a section 1514 protest-or even filed on
Customs Form 19 for such protests-does not make it a pro-
test if that is inconsistent with the law. Courts have long rec-
ognized that the failure to use the term "protest" or refer to
section 1514 in a letter contesting a Customs Service liquida-
tion is still a proper protest if it complies in other respects.37
Consistent with those decisions, the erroneous designation of
a document as a "protest" does not convert it into a protest.
Finally, since Customs regulations do not provide for any
procedure to contest liquidated damages beyond the thirtieth
day, the courts should be pleased by efforts to induce Customs
to consider the validity of its assessment under the protest pro-
cedures. Adoption of this method is helpful in avoiding litiga-
tion and in developing a meaningful administrative record
should litigation become necessary. In fact, Customs regula-
tions should be revised to provide for the filing of administra-
tive petitions contesting the legality of liquidated damage cases
until such time as the government files a collection action.
Such petitions should be acceptable since the same issues may
be raised in any subsequent collection case. By developing
regulations, Customs can crystallize the procedures and make
certain that issues are presented to the proper persons and
handled efficiently. In the absence of Customs regulations, we
will continue to operate in an environment where ad hoc, extra-
legal procedures are adopted to get the attention of Customs
officials on legitimate issues by parties hoping to avoid unnec-
essary litigation.
36. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing Utex and Toshoku
cases).
37. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 955, 958-60 (Cust. Ct.
1974).
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C. Jurisdictional Issues: The Timeliness of Protests
If liquidated damage notices and demands are protestable
for only a ninety-day period, courts can anticipate disputes
over whether a notice or demand was mailed within ninety
days before receipt of a protest. Protests, by statute, must be
filed within ninety days of the date of the protested decision or
of the posted bulletin notice of liquidation. 38 The one excep-
tion to this rule is that protests by a surety may be filed within
ninety days of the date that a demand is mailed to the surety.39
Similarly, Customs ordinarily mails liquidated damage notices
(or demands) to the surety in the form of a "notice of penalty
and/or liquidated damages."4
In at least two cases where a protestor has demonstrated
non-receipt of a Customs Service notice, courts have placed an
exceptionally heavy burden upon Customs to prove that it
mailed the notice in question.4 In considering the surety pro-
test statute, the CIT has relied upon those decisions in holding
protests to be timely which had been filed as late as thirteen
months after the date on which Customs claimed it had com-
menced mailing demands on a monthly basis.4 2
There is at least one other instance in which Customs has
a statutory requirement to mail a notice: the date a protest
decision is mailed commences the 180-day period for the filing
of a summons.43 Customs has avoided litigation over when it
mailed the decision by adopting a regulation which provides
that the decision date recorded on the protest is deemed to be
the date it was mailed.44 No such regulation has been adopted
with respect to surety protests, however, nor has Customs
adopted any other procedure that would avoid future litiga-
tion.
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(2) (1988).
39. Id.
40. Customs Form 5955A; see, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Villanueva,
706 F. Supp. 923, 930 (Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 880 F.2d 409 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (referring
to Customs Form 5955A).
41. See Clayton Chem. and Packaging Co. v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 628,
630 (Cust. Ct. 1957); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. United States, 22 Cust. Ct.
209 (1949).
42. See, e.g., Peerless Ins. Co. v. United States, slip op., No. 81-5-00652 (Ct. Int'l
TradeJune 3, 1982).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2636 (1988).
44. 19 C.F.R. § 174.30(a) (1990).
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III. FUTURE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ISSUES
The loosely defined relationship of Customs, importers,
and sureties will continue to create new administrative and ju-
dicial issues with respect to contesting (and collecting) claims
for liquidated damages.
A. Customs'Failure to Follow Its Regulations
Legal challenges to liquidated damage claims are often
based on claims that the Customs Service failed to follow a reg-
ulation that allegedly established a precondition to collecting
under the bond. Courts have held that the failure of Customs
to follow its regulations, however, does not give rise to a de-
fense of equitable estoppel.45 Alternatively, it has now been
held by an appellate court, as a matter of law, that the govern-
ment has no cause of action under a bond where Customs has
failed to follow certain of its regulations.46 Earlier, the CIT
had held that a failure to issue a notice of liquidation extension
to the surety would only prevent Customs from collecting from
the surety if it were proven that non-delivery was prejudicial to
the surety.47 The absence of the need to demonstrate preju-
dice in both the Utex and Toshoku cases appears to arise from a
determination that the regulations violated in those cases were
mandatory, whereas the regulation violated in Old Republic In-
surance Co., Inc. v. United States48 was directory and not required
by statute.49
Future litigants no doubt will raise such Customs Service
omissions in defense of collection actions. The need to deter-
mine whether the violated regulation or statute is directory or
mandatory, and whether or not there is a need to establish
prejudice, are likely to be critical issues.
45. See United States v. Federal Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 1012, 1013-14 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987).
46. For example, when Customs has failed to issue a re-delivery notice prior to
liquidation. See, e.g., United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 250 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
47. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 943, 947 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1986).
48. Id.
49. Compare supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing Utex and
Toshoku cases) with supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing Old Republic
case).
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Earlier cases often involved a threshold issue as to
whether or not the regulation in question was an implied part
of the bond. If not, the surety then had no reason to complain
about the government's failure to follow the regulations. In
Old Republic, the CIT held that the regulation would be implied
so long as it was for the benefit of the surety. 0 In that case,
the regulation provided notice to the surety (in addition to
statutory notice to the importer) and was therefore held to be
for the benefit of the surety and implied into the bond. In con-
trast, the government has argued in more recent litigation that
the regulatory provision under which courtesy copies of liqui-
dated damage notices are supplied to the surety is not a regu-
lation "for the benefit of the surety" and is not an implied part
of the bond.5' Thus, it appears that this issue will be raised in
future cases unless the courts devise a definitive standard that
is clear and dispositive enough so as to eliminate all ambiguity.
Any regulation that requires Customs to provide a notice
to the surety should unquestionably be regarded as a part of
the bond. The government has argued unconvincingly that
such notices are for its benefit in that they protect revenue. In
fact, the benefits to the government are minimal in comparison
to those for the surety. The notice enables the surety to make
intelligent underwriting decisions, including refusals to write
future bonds. It also enables it to post sufficient reserves to
protect itself against future liabilities. In contrast, Customs
gains no advantage because the notice will not enable it to col-
lect any more than the face amount of the bond. It cannot
change its position in any respect.
Finally, it is worth noting that the bonds established by
Customs under its uniform bond procedure actually have no
substantive text other than the Customs regulations.52 Thus,
while the courts may have previously interpreted the meaning
of various paragraphs of Customs bonds, future cases will deal
almost exclusively with interpretations of Customs regulations.
50. Old Republic, 645 F. Supp. at 954.
51. See Washington Int'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 663 (involving re-
quirement that Customs "immediately" issue liquidated damages where estimated
duties are unpaid), aff'd, 889 F.2d 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1989); 19 C.F.R. §§ 142.15 &
172.1 (1990).
52. T.D. 84-213, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 597 (1984).
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B. The Burden of Proof In Liquidated Damage Cases:
Who Is the Recordkeeper?
Evidentiary issues can be expected to be raised in future
liquidated damage cases regarding which party has the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion on critical issues, despite the fact
that such evidentiary issues have not been crucial in recent de-
cisions. In both Toshoku and Utex, the government readily con-
ceded the facts with respect to the issuance of re-delivery no-
tices.53 Moreover, the CIT in American Motorists Insurance Co. v.
Villanueva 54 concluded that the surety could not require Cus-
toms to produce copies of bonds covering over one hundred
entries after the surety had failed to raise such questions in
response to four prior notices.55
Thus far, it has been traditional to assume that the govern-
ment's position will prevail for at least two reasons when in-
complete or imperfect information is available to the parties
and the court. First, its actions are protected by the so-called
"presumption of correctness." 56 Second, the party most likely
to challenge the Customs decision-the "owner, importer,
consignee, or agent thereof"-should have most of the evi-
dence available to it because it is subject to a statutory require-
ment to maintain all pertinent records. Specifically, Judge
Tsoucalas of the CIT has observed with respect to the surety
that "Customs is not plaintiff's private recordkeeper." 58
Nonetheless, ongoing developments suggest that future
cases will call upon the courts to determine whether the gov-
ernment position must fail for lack of evidentiary support.
These developments include the increasing movement toward
a "paperless environment" in which the government will be-
come increasingly reliant upon information key-punched into a
computer and not upon retained original documents, and the
53. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing Toshoku and Utex
cases).
54. 706 F. Supp. 923 (Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 880 F.2d 409 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
55. Id. at 931.
56. Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Courts
have imposed a dual burden of proof on importers in such instances. The importer
must first prove that the government's classification is incorrect, and must then also
prove that the importer's classification is correct. Id.
57. 19 U.S.C. § 1508 (1988).
58. American Motorists, 706 F. Supp. at 930.
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absence of requirements that many critical evidentiary docu-
ments (or communications) be provided to all potential liti-
gants. In fact, the surety is not routinely permitted to receive
many crucial documents. Two examples will illustrate the
emerging problem.
Illustration 1: Proving the existence of the bond.
Will proof of the following circumstances be sufficient
for a surety to defend a claim brought against it by Cus-
toms? Neither the surety nor the broker has any record of
the existence of a bond covering a particular entry on which
Customs issued a liquidated damage notice. The importer
is bankrupt, uncooperative, or otherwise unable or unwill-
ing to provide records. The only Customs Service record is
the entry of a three-digit code for a particular surety in its
computerized data base.
Illustration 2: Proving issuance of a redelivery notice.
The broker and the importer have no record of receiv-
ing a redelivery notice from Customs. The surety is not
provided with such a notice under existing regulations.
Customs has no copies of an actual redelivery notice, but its
computerized data base indicates that a notice was issued
prior to the date of liquidation. The importer might not be
able to defend against that collection action, but the surety
should be able to.
In these and similar illustrations, it is the Author's opinion
that the burden must be borne by the government. Proof of
the terms and conditions of the bond is the basic element of
the affirmative case to be established by the government in a
collection action: it must prove the existence of the debt, the
amount of the debt, and the responsibility of the defendant
(importer or surety) for the debt. Moreover, while the govern-
ment has complete and specific information available to it, the
surety is forced to rely upon intermediate sources where it has
not received original documents. Except for the initial bond
itself, the surety has no reliable source of information other
than the government.
On the other hand, the surety does not receive the critical
notices that flow between Customs, the importer, and its bro-
ker during the course of government decision-making. The
surety is not entitled to receive notices of detention, refusal, or
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redelivery, requests for information, or notices of change or
reports of investigation or audit. While Customs has recently
agreed to provide computerized information identifying en-
tries, importers, and certain other related information re-
garded as covered by a surety's bond, the significant informa-
tion that forms the basis of a protest or petition is not provided
to the surety until after a breach occurs.5"
Additionally, the importer is not a reliable source of infor-
mation for the surety. It is the party in default. It is threatened
by both Customs and the surety. Thus, it is illogical to assume
that the importer would cooperate with the surety. The cus-
tom-house broker (in the event the importer used one) might
be a logical source of information. The broker's files, however,
are generally not as complete as those maintained by Customs.
Furthermore, Customs regulations do not require the broker
to share information with the surety.
Thus, future cases are likely to raise the evidentiary ques-
tion in a far different context because the Customs Service has
moved toward a "paperless" environment. The records that
remain available to Customs to establish its claims in the future
will be computerized, less reliable, and far less probative. Im-
porters and brokers able to demonstrate that their files do not
include duplicate originals confirming the computerized Cus-
toms information are likely to have thereby rebutted any pre-
sumption of regularity attaching to the government's comput-
erized records. In these circumstances, the burden of persua-
sion would shift to the government.
Sureties-when they are entitled to receive records as part
of the regulatory process-should have the same limited bur-
den of proof. Where the sureties are not provided documents
during the administrative proceeding (e.g., notices of redeliv-
ery or refusal of admission), however, the burden of proof may
rest entirely with the government.
C. Sanction Procedures: The Next Generation of Cases
It is now a clear matter of law that Customs may sanction
sureties if they are substantially delinquent in their obliga-
59. Customs Service Notice, 53 Fed. Reg. 6,216 (Mar. 1, 1988).
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tions.6 ° The lower court in the American Motorists case, how-
ever, implicitly recognized that another plaintiff in another
case might raise issues that the courts could view differently:
the Court is of the opinion that 113 claims against which
plaintiff neither made a concerted effort to rebut nor file
timely petitions constitute significant delinquency. Under
the facts of this case, plaintiff "cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."'"
Two general observations should be made regarding the
sanction procedure's general vulnerability to attack. First, the
sanction procedure is erroneously modeled after the "immedi-
ate-delivery suspension" procedure. Second, liquidated dam-
ages are not subject to clear and inflexible rules governing the
amount and due da te for payment.
The surety sanction procedure was established by the Cus-
toms Service in order to collect debts under a threat which
would be taken seriously by the debtor. Customs first at-
tempted this procedure in 1981 to collect increased duty bills.
This action was preliminarily enjoined in Old Republic Insurance
Company v. Pitman,62 primarily because no regulation author-
ized such a procedure. Customs then re-established the proce-
dure through a regulation adopted in 1984.63
The procedure involved in the Pitman case, as well as the
procedure subsequently adopted in regulations, was modeled
after the authority of the Customs Service to "sanction" delin-
quent importers by suspending their immediate delivery privi-
leges. 64 While both procedures are effective tools for collect-
ing debts, they are not analogous. The suspension of immedi-
ate delivery privileges merely places the importer on a cash
basis; it cannot postpone deposit of estimated duty for ten days
after release of the goods, and the importer must deposit the
duty prior to release of the goods. Suspension of this privilege
merely places an additional financial and logistical burden
upon the importer. In sharp contrast, surety sanctions actually
60. See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Villanueva, 706 F. Supp. 923 (Ct. Int'l
Trade), aff'd, 880 F.2d 409 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
61. Id. at 931 (citation omitted).
62. 520 F. Supp. 1225 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
63. T.D. 84-213, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 597 (1984).
64. See 19 C.F.R. § 142.25 (1990).
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put the surety out of the business of writing single transaction
bonds for a period of five days. Moreover, such sanctions may
inflict long-standing if not irreparable damage upon the
surety's ability to write bonds even after they are lifted. The
severe nature of the surety sanction was described by the court
in Pitman:
Nothing can disturb the confidence of an importing public
faster or with more certainty than the knowledge, or even a
mere suggestion that a surety on the public's bonds lacks
the financial stability that the public was led to believe it
possessed when engaged. Obviously, therefore, it was to
guard against such an event that the Secretary [referring to
the Treasury regulations governing revocation of the certifi-
cation of a surety to do government business, found at 31
C.F.R. § 223.17-21] chose to preside over events influenc-
ing the exercise of such devastating power, and then only
after shepherding these events through carefully detailed
procedure designed to accord the surety protection of a val-
uable property right safeguarded by constitutional due pro-
cess.
6 5
Thus, surety sanctions raise a far greater need for strict
adherence to due process standards than does the immediate
delivery suspension procedure. It is also significant that Cus-
toms now has applied the surety sanction procedures to liqui-
dated damage cases as opposed to duty assessment cases. The
Pitman case, for example, involved increased duties whereas
the American Motorists case involved liquidated damages.
Increased duty assessments are sums certain and final.
There is no question about the amount of an increased duty
bill and there is no question about the procedures under which
it can be contested. The time limits provided in the protest
statute unquestionably apply. Whatever question might have
existed with regard to the date on which the increased duty
bills become due and owing (or delinquent) was settled both
by the CIT 66 and in subsequently adopted legislation and reg-
ulations.
Liquidated damage claims do not involve such certain and
65. Pitman, 520 F. Supp. at 1229.
66. See Heraeus-Amersil, Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 770, 774 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1981), aft'd, 671 F.2d 1356 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
67. See, e.g., Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, codified in scattered sections of 28
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final amounts and due dates. The applicability of the time lim-
its in the protest statute and the right to raise legal defenses in
a collection action are still subject to debate. Furthermore, liq-
uidated damages historically have been subject to mitigation
and/or compromise even after the filing of a collection action.
In contrast, the Customs Service historically has not shown
such flexibility with respect to duty assessments. The full
amount of the revenue (duty as opposed to liquidated dam-
ages) is traditionally protected.
With respect to existing regulations and procedures, the
following issues are likely to arise in the courts:
1. Where the government makes demand on surety for damages that
were neither petitioned nor protested by a solvent principal, the surety can
be expected to demand that Customs impose sanctions against the princi-
pal first.
Under existing Customs regulations and practices, the de-
linquency of the principal will occur prior to the date the
surety becomes eligible for its own sanctions. Customs is less
likely to sanction the principal, however, than it is to pursue
collection and sanctions against its surety.
As a practical matter, a surety discovering that its principal
is solvent is less likely to protect itself from potential sanctions
by filing a petition or protest against the Customs Service de-
mand. Principals are expected to take care of their obligations
and, in most instances, they do. Customs normally does not
wish to be burdened with additional petitions from sureties in
such cases, preferring to work exclusively with the principal.
The Customs Service is capable of easily and routinely
sanctioning such importers through their computerized notice,
collections, and selectivity system. Ultimately, the omission
may give rise to a challenge through the sanction procedure
itself.
2. Sureties will insist that they be given the same mitigation offer
previously extended to their principals.
Sureties are not provided with copies of mitigation deci-
sions offered to principals, nor are they notified of the amount
of any such offer. Yet, if a principal defaults on such an offer
U.S.C. (1988); T.D. 85-93, 19 Cust. B. & Dec. 209 (1985): T.D. 86-178, 20 Cust. B. &
Dec. 500 (1986); 19 C.F.R. § 24.3a(b)(2) (1990).
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or refuses to accept it, the surety has historically been sub-
jected to a demand for payment of the full liquidated damages.
Customs Service headquarters has indicated it will
reprogram its computers to incorporate mitigation offers into
the first demand on surety; however, that has not happened as
of this writing. Such action is not required by the regulations,
nor does it appear to be the practice of district penalty offices.
As an example, the Author's office received a decision from
Customs addressed to a client/importer that included the fol-
lowing language: "Payment of US$1,547.90 should be made
to the District Director of Customs, Miami, Florida within
thirty days from the date of this letter or demand will be made
on the surety for US$77,395.00, the full amount of the liqui-
dated damages assessed."68
3. When Customs determines that it will discharge a principal,
sureties will urge that they also be discharged.
The liability of the surety and its principal is joint and sev-
eral. This concept is appropriate where Customs elects to sue
one party as opposed to another on the basis of their respec-
tive solvency or ability to be sued. In at least two instances,
however, the concept ofjoint and several liability is likely to be
challenged.
The first occurs when Customs enters into a compromise
settlement with the principal and does not include the surety in
that settlement. This changes the obligations of the bond. It is
a change, therefore, to which the surety is entitled to receive
notice and an opportunity to acquiesce.69 Under the general
law of suretyship, the new compromise settlement constitutes a
new contract or novation which substitutes for the bond.70
In the second situation, the Customs Service issues a deci-
sion to a bond principal stating that it will not be pursued be-
cause Customs has determined that the principal on the bond
was not actually a party to the import transaction. If this find-
ing is true, the bond was never valid and no claim should be
made against the importer or the surety. Whether true or not,
68. Customs Service Letter of Dec. 22, 1988 (File 87-0935:KBT) from the Miami
Customs Regional Counsel's Office (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal office).
69. See 19 C.F.R. § 113.23 (1990).
70. A. STEARNS &J. ELDER, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 6.6 (5th ed. 1972).
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the finding by the Customs Service prejudices the right of the
surety to seek reimbursement from its principal and may there-
fore constitute grounds for relieving it from further responsi-
bility under the bond.
4. The procedures under which Customs sanctions sureties are
vague and vulnerable to attack.
The American Motorists court alluded to the vague Customs
sanctioning procedures by implying that a different party in a
different context might be viewed more favorably.7 The reg-
ulations invite litigation on the following issues:
a. What constitutes "significantly delinquent"?
In sharp contrast to the number of cases and amount in
dispute in American Motorists, the Customs Service has pub-
lished a standard which is far less substantial:
District level: ten cases and/or US$25,000.00 for considera-
tion of show cause letter.
Regional level: forty cases and/or US$100,000.00 for con-
sideration of show cause letter. 2
Since liquidated damages are typically set in amounts
equal to the value of a single importation, the US$100,000
mark is often exceeded; the US$25,000 mark is exceeded in
virtually every case. Furthermore, it is unlikely that either
amount would be regarded as substantial in comparison to the
financial stability of surety companies listed on the Treasury
Certification List.
b. What constitutes 'just cause "for withholding payment 73 or "a
substantial question of law as to whether a breach of bond obligation has
occurred" ?
74
The Customs Service and the U.S. Department of Justice
might agree that the surety has raised a legal issue justifying its
non-payment, even though it is a legal opinion contrary to the
official position of the Customs Service. In other words, it may
be an issue to which the surety is entitled to have its day in
court. However, local Customs officials are left to their com-
plete discretion as to whether a legal issue is sufficient to merit
71. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Villanueva, 706 F. Supp. 923, 931 (Ct. Int'l
Trade), aff'd, 880 F.2d 409 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
72. T.D. 89-57, 23 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 21 (May 4, 1989).
73. 19 C.F.R. § 113.38 (c)(1)-(3) (1990).
74. d. § 113.38(c)(1).
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referral to headquarters under internal advice procedures. v5
There are no standards or criteria as to what type of legal issue
may be raised in defense of a collection action or in response
to a threat or sanctions. Moreover, there is no requirement
that the person deciding the validity of the surety's response to
a show cause letter be a person different from either the official
who issued the show cause letter or the person who handled
the liquidated damage cases. The circumstances suggest that
the broad authority vested in local officials has not been placed
into a regulatory framework that will withstand scrutiny.
c. "Last chance" to make payment without sanctions.
The current regulations require that the surety be sanc-
tioned a minimum of five days where its response to the show
cause letter is found to be inadequate. The surety should be
provided an option to make payment without suffering sanc-
tions in the event that its good-faith, written response to the
show cause letter is rejected. In this regard, it is interesting
that when Customs proposed the surety sanction procedures,
it also proposed a show cause letter that would routinely pro-
vide the surety with a three-day period to make payment with-
out sanctions.76 This "last chance" provision was not incorpo-
rated into the letter issued to the surety in American Motorists,
nor has it surfaced in most of the letters viewed by the Author.
CONCLUSION
A review of the rapidly evolving judicial and regulatory de-
velopments with respect to liquidated damages reveals that
there are many important areas which have not been the sub-
ject of any comprehensive scheme or plan. The right to protest
liquidated damage claims remains open to debate. The right
of sureties to gain access to basic documentary evidence con-
cerning breaches of their bonds is still evolving. The identifi-
cation of the obligations and rights of Customs bond principals
and sureties is incomplete, as is the development of lawful pro-
cedures under which those parties may act responsibly as liqui-
dated damage claims progress from notice and demand
through cancellation, payment, sanctions or litigation. Theju-
75. Id. § 177.11.
76. See 48 Fed. Reg. 11,073 (Appendix F, 1983).
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risdictional prerequisite and, once in court, the evidentiary
burdens also involve unanswered questions. The courts are
likely to be called upon to fill such voids with their interpreta-
tions unless Customs and the U.S. Congress adopt the specific
regulations and legislation needed to define a more compre-
hensive system.
